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A common assumption in strategic management, as well as
in financial economics, is the positive relationship between
risk and return. Criticizing this idea, Bowman (1980) found
that the relationship between risk and return could be nega-
tive with accounting measures. This work was the origin of a
fruitful research stream that studied the causes of Bowman’s
paradox (e.g., Ruefli, Collins, & LaCugna, 1999).
In this stream, we find works that theoretically try to jus-
tify the inverse risk–return relationship (theoretical expla-
nations), in addition to works that defend the methodological
problems associated with the empirical tests that can be the
origin of such a relationship (Nickel & Rodríguez, 2002).
Inside the first group of works are two different streams: first
are theories such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) and behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March,
1963) that consider a double risk–return relationship (nega-
tive for low outcomes and positive for high ones), and, sec-
ond is the influence of strategic differences among firms in
the risk–return relationship. Thus, the diversification strat-
egy (Bettis & Hall, 1982; Bettis & Mahajan, 1985), market
power (Cool, Dierickx, & Jemison, 1989), or a long history
of high-risk levels (Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Deephouse &
Wiseman, 2000) could also influence the risk–return asso-
ciation. On the other hand, those works that have proven
how the paradox could be the natural consequence of meth-
odological problems do not allow for the generalization of its
results. These problems could be associated with the lack of
identification in every test that has employed a mean–vari-
ance approach for representing return and risk (Ruefli et al.,
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1999: 178) or used cross-sectional methodology (Lehner,
2000: 63). Therefore, at the present time, the main gap in
the research on Bowman’s paradox is the lack of identifica-
tion of the tests, and, as a consequence, theories cannot be
accepted and generalized.
The aim of this paper is to translate the postulates on risk
taking of one theory in particular—prospect theory—to a
heteroskedastic econometric model that removes the lack of
identification.
This new model is tested on a sample formed by the com-
panies of the S&P Global 100 index. This sample is interest-
ing because of the lack of research that has tested the paradox
in economies that differ from the United States; there is also
a scarcity of tests that have used market measures.
In summary, this study seeks to offer three main contribu-
tions to the literature on Bowman’s paradox. First, we pro-
vide a heteroskedastic model that overcomes the identification
problems and allows generalizing prospect theory as an ex-
planation for Bowman’s paradox. Second, this model is em-
pirically tested using market measures. This provides an
additional step in this research stream, because the support
obtained by prospect theory may be extended with market
data. Third, it is tested on an international database so that
we are able to generalize this behavior to countries other than
the United States.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The Identification Problem
The identification problem arises when the data can be ex-
plained by different theories, but it is not possible to distin-
guish between them (Greene, 1993: 585). There are two
identification problems in Bowman’s paradox tests: the use of
a mean–variance approach and a cross-sectional design.
In the mean–variance approach, its relation could be pro-
duced by the behavior of the decision maker or by a possible
temporal instability of the return distribution (Ruefli, 1990:
371). Ruefli (1990) demonstrated that a negative or a double
risk–return relationship for a period could be generated by a
series of positive relations in the subperiods.
The identification problem produced by the temporal in-
stability of the returns distribution is augmented because both
the sample mean and the sample variance are functions of the
same variable. Therefore, if they are included as two different
variables in a regression model, the number of variables is
smaller than the number of parameters (Lehner, 2000: 66;
Ruefli, 1990: 372; Ruefli et al., 1999: 172). Finally, by re-
gressing sample variances on sample means, a negative rela-
tion between the independent variable and the error term is
produced, violating a key requirement of the regression model
(Ruefli, 1991: 1211).
The second source of misidentification is the cross-sectional
design. This kind of analysis has been used in most studies
that have tested the risk attitude explanations for the risk–
return relationship (Lee, 1997: 63). Similar to the former tem-
poral instability, the differences among the firm-specific return
distributions could permit a negative cross-sectional risk–re-
turn relationship from different positive risk–return relation-
ships for each firm individually. In this sense, it is possible
that each firm of an industry exhibits a risk-averse attitude,
and, hence, the risk–return relation for each firm would be
positive. However, it is also possible that the firms with more
profitable investment opportunities have the ability to ob-
tain profits at a lower risk level, producing a negative cross-
sectional risk–return relationship for the industry.
In other words, the variation in risk taking across organi-
zations can be produced either by stable differences among
them that also produce differences in their successes (Bettis
& Hall, 1982; Cool et al., 1989; Miller & Bromiley, 1990),
or from different risk attitudes, as behavioral theories hy-
pothesize (March, 1988: 6). Therefore, a cross-sectional de-
sign does not allow for the differentiation between one
explanation or another and would be an improper method
with which to test behavioral perspectives (Lee, 1997;
MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). This criticism is based on
the fact that risk attitudes are dependent not only on the
context of the decision making but also on various character-
istics of the decision maker or the organization (MacCrimmon
and Wehrung, 1986). Therefore, the risk attitude is a firm-
specific concept. Because a behavioral perspective on risk tak-
ing is entirely based on changing risk attitudes, it cannot be
properly tested in a cross-sectional design but should be tested
on a firm-specific basis (Lee, 1997: 63).
Overcoming the Identification Problem
Figure 1 shows us the methodologies that are the origin of
the identification problem: the mean–variance approach and
the cross-sectional model. Close to its antithetic methodol-
ogy, we arrange the solution methodologies that we propose
in this paper to avoid the lack of identification: hetero-
skedastic and time-series models. Each cell of the matrix puts
together different phenomena that could explain the data with
the different methodologies. Thus, we see that the only solu-
tion that overcomes the identification problem is the fourth
cell of Figure 1. That is, data can be explained by only one
phenomenon.
The cross-sectional design problem. This identification
problem can be eliminated simply by adopting a longitudi-
nal approach. Moreover, the longitudinal firm-specific design
is more appropriate for testing hypotheses based on risk atti-
tudes (Lee, 1997), as previously stated.
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The time-varying returns distribution problem. Regard-
ing the first source of the lack of identification, Bromiley (1991a:
1208) stated that the most direct way to avoid the problem of
temporal instability is to assume that the returns distribution
is stable for the period analyzed. This solution, however, pre-
sents several problems. First, we can assume this stability only
for short periods, not for the long run (Lehner, 2000: 67). Sec-
ond, this assumption requires that each firm has its own re-
turns distribution to avoid the spurious correlation (Ruefli,
1991: 1213; Ruefli & Wiggins, 1994: 755). Third, if a longi-
tudinal approach is used, this assumption implicitly contra-
dicts a postulate of prospect theory: the stability of the
distribution of returns implies the stability of its first two
moments. Therefore, if both the mean and the variance are con-
sidered fixed for a period, the variance will be independent of
the expectation, and hence it makes no sense to test the hy-
pothesis that the variance is dependent on the expected return.
In conclusion, another solution, different from time sta-
bility, must be used. Ruefli et al. (1999) propose the use of
alternative measures of risk for overcoming the identification
problem arising from the validation problem of the variance
(Bromiley, Miller, & Rau, 2002: 264; Nickel & Rodríguez,
2002: 13). In this sense, various works have employed vari-
ables such as the variance of the forecasts of analysts (Bromiley,
1991b), content analysis–based measures (Bowman, 1984; Lee,
1997), ordinal risk (Collins & Ruefli, 1992), and downside
risk (Miller & Leiblein, 1996). However, these measures can
also present their own problems, they are still rarely studied,
and the variety of measures makes the comparison between
different works difficult (Bromiley et al., 2002: 264–266;
Nickel & Rodríguez, 2002: 14).
Therefore, it is desirable to obtain a third solution: to re-
cover the variance as the principal risk measure, provided that
the problems associated with this measure are solved. The
advantages of this solution are clear: variance is the risk mea-
sure most often utilized by different research streams, not only
by Bowman’s paradox, so it can make the comparison between
works easier. Its calculation is also simple and is easily under-
stood from both the scientific and managerial views. Finally,
the variance is a good measure of uncertainty, and the theories
employed to study the paradox from the risk attitude per-
spective—prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and
behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963)—make
their hypotheses about the relationship between return and
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the literature has highlighted two
problems related to the use of the variance—an identification
problem and a validity problem.
The first problem, which is the central point of this paper,
is that the variance can cause the identification problem if it
is estimated by the sample variance and the expectation is
estimated by the sample mean. This problem is overcome in
this work by developing a model with a single variable (the
firm rate of return) whose first two moments are mathemati-
cally related in the sense that prospect theory predicts. In this
way, the variance and the expectation of returns are estimated
without employing the sample variance or the sample mean.
The second problem (the validity of the variance as a measure
of risk) is dealt with below.
In summary, as noted in Figure 1, the identification prob-
lem can be solved if the model meets three requirements. First,
it must be a firm-specific time-series model, where expecta-
tion and variance can change across time. Second, it must be
a heteroskedastic model, allowing the change of variance over
time. Third, the expectation and the variance can be linked in
the returns distribution, but not as two different variables in
a regression model.
FIGURE 1
Methodological Matrix
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Model Development
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) has commonly
been employed by researchers of Bowman’s paradox to ex-
plain the risk–return relationship (see, for example, the lit-
erature reviews by Bromiley et al., 2002, and Nickel and
Rodríguez, 2002). According to this theory, there is a double
attitude toward risk, which results in a double risk–return
relationship. This double attitude depends on the compari-
son between the expected return and the return the decision
maker aspires to (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979: 277). Thus,
when the expected return exceeds a target or aspiration point,
decision makers exhibit a risk-averse attitude; on the other
hand, when the expected return does not reach the target point,
the risk attitude becomes risk seeking. Therefore, for the de-
velopment of the model, we must define three concepts: ex-
pected return, aspiration or target point, and risk. The
development of the model is completed when the relation-
ships between these measures are established.
Expected return. We define the evolution of the return vari-
able over time to develop a new econometric model. Without
loss of generality, we accept, as a first assumption, that re-
turns evolve over time following an autoregressive time-series
model, as described in Equation (1):
( )− − −= +ε1 2, ,..., ,it it it it n itR f R R R (1)
where R
it
 is the return for firm i in period t; R
it–1
, R
it–2
, ..., R
it–n
are the rates of return obtained in the n previous periods; and
ε
it
 is the error term that is assumed to be normally distrib-
uted with zero mean and constant variance.
The expected return is obtained by calculating, at period
t – 1, the expectation of Equation (1) for period t:
( ) ( )
( )
t it t it it it n it
t it it it n
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, , ..., .
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(2)
When the expected return for period t is estimated, the real
rates of return, obtained in the previous periods, are already
known, and are therefore constants, not random variables.
The aspiration point. The aspiration or reference point for
prospect theory corresponds to an asset position that the deci-
sion maker had expected to attain (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979: 286). Previous literature on strategic management
(Bamberger & Fiegenbaum, 1996; Fiegenbaum, Hart, &
Schendel, 1996) has proposed that managerial aspiration lev-
els can be the result of a combination of internal (managerial
considerations and outcome criteria), external (competitors,
customers, suppliers, stakeholders), and temporal consider-
ations (past, current, and future performance). However, at
the empirical level, there is, to our knowledge, no model that
explains how these three groups of variables can be combined
for obtaining the “right” reference point. The most common
solution applied in the previous literature has been the selec-
tion of one of the three sources of aspiration points, assuming
that it prevails over the other two.
In this sense, the empirical studies of prospect and behav-
ioral theory have employed mainly two kinds of reference
points—the social aspiration level and the historical aspira-
tion level (Greve, 1998). The social aspiration level is the re-
sult of the influence of external forces and is imposed upon
the performance of the firms of the same industry. The most
common way of measuring this social aspiration has been by
using the mean or median performance of the industry (e.g.,
Bromiley, 1991b; Fiegenbaum, 1990; Fiegenbaum & Tho-
mas, 1988; Jegers, 1991; Miller & Leiblein, 1996). The his-
torical aspiration level is a firm-specific level based on the
historical performance of the same firm, generally being the
previous performance level (Bromiley, 1991b; Lee, 1997;
Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999).
The aspiration concept employed in this work is the his-
torical aspiration level, considering the previous rate of re-
turn as the aspiration level. This selection is based on two
reasons. First, the historical aspiration level seems to be more
consistent with the postulates of prospect theory than the so-
cial aspiration level (Lee, 1997: 62). Prospect theory posits
the status quo of a firm’s performance as the reference point
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979: 286), so this status quo is more
easily identifiable with the previous performance than with
the mean or median performance of the industry.
Second, several authors have demonstrated that the risk–
return relationship is better explained when firm-specific tar-
get levels are used instead of aspiration levels common for all
firms (Gooding, Goel, & Wiseman, 1996; Lehner, 2000).
Nevertheless, although we have employed the historical
aspiration point in the empirical tests of our model, the theo-
retical model can be applied to any aspiration point, and hence
we denote the aspiration point by A
it
 instead of its empirical
value R
it–1
.
The risk measure. The risk measure is probably the most
controversial point of the works that have studied the para-
dox (Bromiley et al., 2002: 261). As noted above, the vari-
ance has been criticized because of two problems—an
identification problem and a validation problem. The first is
solved with the different methodology of our model.
However, the variance has also been criticized, and, as a
consequence, it might be considered a “wrong” way to mea-
sure the risk. From a managerial focus, “risk” is not the same
as “uncertainty” (Bromiley et al., 2002: 260). “Risk” is asso-
ciated with the chance and the magnitude of loss, whereas
“uncertainty” is associated with the variance (March & Shapira,
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1987; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). If we accept these two identifi-
cations—risk equals the chance of loss and uncertainty equals
the variance—prospect theory reaches this same conclusion,
although it identifies implicitly “risk” with “uncertainty.”
That is, in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) nomenclature,
the risk-averse or risk-seeking attitudes (uncertainty from
management focus) are a consequence of the permanent loss-
aversion attitude (risk from management focus) of the deci-
sion maker (Barberis & Huang, 2001: 1252; Olsen, 1997:
226). Therefore, and because we want to test prospect theory
hypotheses, we should employ an uncertainty measure, which
is the variance. Although “uncertainty measure” could be more
appropriate for the variance than “risk measure,” for coher-
ency with the mentioned theory and the previous works, we
will continue referring to the variance as the “risk measure.”
There is a second validation problem with the variance:
the traditional financial tenet states that only the systematic
portion of risk (that is, the portion of risk that is related to
the global economic forces) is priced in the market, and hence
only this portion of risk should be considered by managers
(Aaker & Jacobson, 1987: 279; Chatterjee, Lubatkin, &
Schulze, 1999: 556; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994: 100). This
financial idea has resulted in the fact that the most widely
used market risk measure in the strategic management litera-
ture has been systematic risk (Ruefli et al., 1999) instead of
the variance of returns.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons for using the total
risk measure (variance) instead of systematic risk. First, the
variance of returns could be a more appropriate proxy for the
managerial perspective on risk than the systematic risk
(Veliyath & Ferris, 1997: 220). Thus, the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) considers only the systematic risk, because
stockholders can reduce the firm-specific unsystematic risk
to zero by simply diversifying their portfolios by buying ad-
ditional shares. However, managers cannot eliminate the un-
systematic portion of risk because they are concerned with
firm-specific risks, and they do not have the opportunity of
diversifying them in the same sense as stockholders (Veliyath
& Ferris, 1997: 219–220).
On the other hand, the managerial control over systematic
risk is theoretically lower than that over the total risk, be-
cause the systematic risk depends not only on managerial ac-
tions but also on market-wide factors (Naylor & Tapon, 1982;
Veliyath & Ferris, 1997).
Moreover, several researchers in financial economics have
obtained a flat relationship between systematic risk and re-
turn, especially Fama and French (1992). One of the explana-
tions for this flat relationship is that the beta parameter of the
CAPM cannot capture all the systematic risk factors that can
influence the stock returns (e.g., Davis, 1994; Fama & French,
1993; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Wang, 2000). If this ex-
planation is accepted, the traditional systematic risk measure
(the beta parameter from the CAPM) does not capture all the
risk factors, and therefore it could not be a proper measure of
risk (Ruefli et al., 1999: 172).
Finally, the value relevance of the systematic risk is based
upon the idea that investors’ portfolios are fully diversified,
and they pursue this full diversification because they are risk
averse in the financial economics sense. Nevertheless, and ac-
cording to prospect theory, it would be possible that inves-
tors could exhibit a risk attitude different from the aversion.
If this is true, they will not always be as fully diversified as
the CAPM predicts, and hence they can also value unsystem-
atic risks (Chatterjee et al., 1999). In this sense, some works
from financial economics have applied prospect theory to the
stock market’s behavior, finding that the loss aversion pre-
dicted by this theory fits much better than the risk aversion
defended by the traditional CAPM model (see, for example,
Barberis & Huang, 2001; Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001).
In summary, all these ideas suggest that the variance of
market return could be selected as the risk measure rather
than systematic risk.
In conclusion, the variance is preferable to other measures
employed in strategic management, because it fits better with
the “risk” concept inherent in prospect theory; and it is also
preferable to systematic risk, because its relevancy from the
focus of managers (not investors) is higher.
Returning to our model, we can obtain the time-varying
risks by calculating the variance of Equation (1) for each pe-
riod. Because the previous rates of return are constant at period
t, the variance of returns is equal to the variance of the error
term in the absence of autocorrelations among the error terms:
( ) ( )t it t itR2 21 1 .− −σ = σ ε (3)
Relations between expectation, aspiration, and risk. As
noted above, when the expected return is greater than the
aspiration point, managers exhibit a risk-averse attitude
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979: 279), which implies a positive
risk–return association. In other words, the higher the expec-
tation, the higher the variance. On the other hand, if the ex-
pectation falls below the aspiration point, the risk attitude is
risk seeking, being the risk taken is higher when the expected
return is lower (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979: 279). In conclu-
sion, the distance (positive or negative) between the expected
return and the aspiration point is positively related with the
risk level. This double risk–return relationship is graphically
presented in Figure 2.
Translating this risk-taking process into an econometric
model, we will have a positive relationship between the vari-
ance of returns and the difference between the expectation
and the aspiration point. We assume that this relationship is
linear because Kahneman and Tversky (1979) simply asserted
that there would be risk aversion in the domain of gains and
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risk seeking in the domain of losses, but they do not explic-
itly make any assertion about the variations of the degrees of
risk aversion or risk seeking (Bromiley et al., 2002: 268–269):
( )
( ) ( )
t it it
t it i i t it it
E R A
E R A
1
2
1 1 1
0
,
−
− −
− >
 ⇒ σ ε = α + β ⋅ − 
(4)
where β
1i
 is the coefficient that relates the expectation-aspira-
tion distance with the risk level, and α
i
 is the constant of the
model.
On the other hand, when the expected return falls below
the target level, managers also increase risk. Once again, we
assume a linear relationship:
( )
( ) ( )
−
− −
− <
 ⇒ σ ε = α + β ⋅ − 
1
2
1 2 1
0
.
t it it
t it i i t it it
E R A
E R A (5)
In this expression, β
2i
 relates the aspiration-expectation dis-
tance with the risk level. The parameter α
i
 is assumed to be
the same constant for simplicity and for assuring the conti-
nuity of the function.
Equations (4) and (5) show the double risk–return relation-
ship predicted by prospect theory. Nevertheless, we can com-
bine these expressions in a single risk–return equation that
resumes these relations in the next equation (sign function):
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t it i it i t it it
it i it t it
d E R A
d A E R
2
1 1 1
2 11 ,
− −
−
 σ ε = α + ⋅β ⋅ − 
 + − ⋅β ⋅ − 
(6)
where d
it
 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the ex-
pected return at period t is higher than the aspiration level,
and 0 otherwise. Two different parameters, β
1i
 and β
2i
, are
employed for the positive and negative distances, because pros-
pect theory postulates different reactions for both kinds of
distances. In fact, prospect theory indicates that the reaction
to negative distances is higher than the reaction to positive
ones (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). These different behaviors
for positive and negative outcomes have been previously tested
by Fiegenbaum (1990), whose results supported this asym-
metric reaction.
In summary, this econometric model describes the behav-
ior of a single variable—the firm rate of return—through a
time-series model (Equation (1)) with a heteroskedastic prob-
lem (Equation (6)). The estimation of the beta parameters
establishes whether the prospect theory postulates are sup-
ported. Thus, if the estimates for both beta parameters are
significantly greater than zero, the prospect theory perspec-
tive on risk taking is supported. If β
1i
 is positive and β
2i
 is
negative, the traditional positive relationship between risk
and return is obtained.
METHODS
Database
The database employed for testing the model is comprised of
the companies that form the S&P Global 100 by February
2002. Stock prices, adjusted for dividends and splits, for the
1990–2000 period were used to compute the variables. When
a company was quoted in various stock markets, prices from
the NYSE were selected, unless the number of valid observa-
tions was less than 500. All prices were obtained from Com-
modity Systems Inc.
Our final database consisted of 97 companies, with the
number of valid observations for the return variable ranging
between 551 and 3,650. The final number of countries was
15, with 10 different sectors. As there is only one variable for
each model, Table 1 shows the sector, country, estimated ex-
pectation, and standard deviation for each company. The rea-
son for testing our model with this database is the lack of
works that have tested the “paradox” in economies different
from the United States. To our knowledge, there are only two
tests with this characteristic—Jegers (1991) and Sinha (1994).
Measures
In contrast with most traditional papers on Bowman’s para-
dox, this paper employs risk and return measures based on
stock market data. Previous studies of the “paradox” using
market variables have produced contradictory results
(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986; Miller & Bromiley, 1990;
Veliyath & Ferris, 1997). Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1986)
tested the relationship between the beta parameter and ac-
counting return, finding a positive relationship between them.
FIGURE 2
Double Risk–Return Relationship Hypothesized by
Behavioral Theories
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Miller and Bromiley (1990) used a stock risk measure, which
included both systematic and unsystematic risk, but found
no influence of stock risk on performance, nor performance
influence on stock risk. Finally, Veliyath and Ferris (1997)
found a flat relationship between accounting return and the
beta parameters, but a significant negative relationship be-
tween accounting return and the total risk, as measured by
the variance of the stock returns. Therefore, the paradox evi-
dence with stock market data is still too weak.
In addition to the weak evidence with stock market data,
it has also been pointed out that the “paradox” could result
from managerial manipulation of accounting information
(Bowman, 1980: 25). Therefore, a direct way to avoid this
problem is to use market measures, which are free from such
manipulation.
Measure of return. The total annual rate of return measure,
which has been frequently used in previous literature (e.g.,
Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Miller & Bromiley, 1990), can be
defined as
it it
it
it
P P
R
P
365
365
,
−
−
−
= (7)
where R
it
 is the annual return for a common stock of firm i at
day t; P
it
 is the adjusted closing price for a common stock of
firm i at day t; and P
it–365
 is the adjusted closing price for that
stock on the same date of the previous year. If the stock did
not quote on that date in the previous year, the nearest previ-
ous price was used. Both prices were adjusted for eliminating
capital variations and dividends. This return measure was cal-
culated for each day between January 1, 1992, and December
31, 2000. The reason for selecting daily prices was to get a
larger number of observations to validate the model.
Expected return. The function described in Equation (1) must
be calculated to estimate the expected return. The procedures
followed for selecting the time-series model were as follows.
First, for assuring that the series were stationary, the Dickey–
Fuller test was performed. (The results of these tests are not
reported in the paper but are available from the authors.) The
results indicated that some series are not stationary if the re-
turn measure is used, but all the series become stationary af-
ter taking first differences. By uniformity, we employed an
integrated model of first order for each company.
Second, to avoid autocorrelation, we included eight lags
of the return variable (Pagan & Schwert, 1990; Schwert,
1989). The results of estimating the expected return demon-
strated that there were no autocorrelations of order eight or
lower. Ljung–Box’s Q′-test values for each firm are also re-
ported in Table 1. Thus, Equations (1) and (2) can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
( )it it i ij it j it j it
j
R R a b R R
8
1 1
1
− − − −
=
− = + ⋅ − +ε∑ (8)
( ) ( )t it it i ij it j it j
j
E R R a b R R
8
1 1 1
1
,− − − − −
=
− = + ⋅ −∑ (9)
where the subscript t denotes time, i denotes the selected com-
pany, and j denotes the number of the lag of the return vari-
able. The estimation of model (9) offers values for the
parameters a
i
 and b
ij
, which permit the estimation of the ex-
pected return for each firm individually at any period.
Risk measure. The right risk measure for our model, dis-
cussed above, is empirically calculated as defined in Equa-
tion (6).
Aspiration point. As noted above, the aspiration point selected
for this work has been the historical aspiration level. The rea-
sons are its firm-specific nature and its coherency with the sta-
tus quo interpretation of the reference point made by prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979: 286; Lee, 1997: 62).
Statistical Methodology
With all the measures developed above, the final model is
( ) ( )t it it i ij it j it j
j
E R R a b R R
8
1 1 1
1
− − − − −
=
− = + ⋅ −∑ (10)
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
− − −
− −
 σ ε = α + ⋅β ⋅ − 
 + − ⋅β ⋅ − 
2
1 1 1 1
2 1 11 ,
t it i it i t it it
it i it t it
d E R R
d R E R (11)
where R
it
 is the only real variable at period t; R
it–1
 is the value
of the aspiration level; d
it
 is an artificial variable to design the
sign function; and a
i
, b
ij
, β
1i
, β
2i
, and α
i
 are the parameters of
the model to be estimated.
The most relevant characteristic of this model is its
heteroskedasticity; that is, the variance of the error term is
not constant for all time periods, but changes over time de-
pending on the difference between the expected return and
the aspiration (R
it–1
). In this paper, we employ a two-stage
estimation method (Greene, 1993: 570–574). First, using or-
dinary least squares, we obtain estimates for the parameters
of the expectation equation and from these calculated regres-
sion residuals. Finally, parameters of the variance equation
are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood of the whole
model. In the second stage, the values of the expectation equa-
tion are recalculated based on the results obtained for the vari-
ance. The statistical program used was the Large-Scale GRG
Solver Engine of Frontline Systems.
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The Wald statistic is calculated to test if the global model
and the parameters are significant. The Wald test has an ad-
vantage over alternative tests (e.g., likelihood ratio or Lagrange
multiplier) because the log-likelihood is maximized only once.
The formulation of the Wald statistic is presented in Greene
(1993: 379–381). The BHHH (Berndt, Hall, Hall, &
Hausman, 1974) method is used to estimate the variances of
the parameters because they are necessary for the computa-
tion of the Wald statistic. This method has some advantages
over alternative methods, such as the efficiency of operations,
and it avoids the approximation errors in the empirical re-
sults (Greene, 1993: 115–116).
RESULTS
As explained above, the estimation of the beta parameters
establishes whether the behavioral theories are supported.
Thus, if the estimates of both beta parameters are signifi-
cantly greater than zero, the behavioral perspective on risk
taking is supported. If β
1i
 is positive and β
2i
 is negative, the
positive relationship between risk and return is obtained.
Table 1 also shows the estimations of the parameters and
their standard errors (in parentheses), as well as the Wald test
for the whole model and the Ljung–Box test values. Because
our interest is centered in the risk, only the variance param-
eters are reported (although estimates for the expectation pa-
rameters are available from the authors).
These results show that the econometric model is signifi-
cant for all the firms ( p-value of the Wald statistic is less than
0.0001 for all the companies), supporting the general valid-
ity of the models and indicating that they do not have auto-
correlation problems because the value of the Q′-statistic is
close to 0 ( p-value ≈ 1).
The estimates for β
1i
 and β
2i
 are positive for the majority of
the firms. In fact, the β
1i
 estimates are significantly positive
(at the 0.05 level) for 90 out of 97 cases. This suggests that
there are only seven exceptions to this positive value. How-
ever, only two of them (Assicurazioni Generali and UBS)
strongly contradict prospect theory, because they have values
that are significantly lower than zero.
On the other hand, the β
2i
 estimates are significantly greater
than zero for 93 of the 97 companies. Nevertheless, the four
exceptions present values that are not significantly different
from zero, and, contrary to β
1i
 and what would be expected if
a permanent risk-aversion attitude was shown, there are no
significant negative values.
Curiously, the two companies that obtained negative esti-
mates for β
1i
 have also obtained no significant estimates for
β
2i
, and they belong to the financials sector. In this sense,
Diageo constitutes another major exception to the model,
because both parameters beta are not significantly different
from zero for this company. The remainder of the firms (94)
have significant positive estimates for β
1i
 or β
2i
, or for both
beta parameters.
On the other hand, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979: 279) postulates that the value function for decision
makers is steeper for losses than for gains. This was inter-
preted by Fiegenbaum (1990: 191), as there is a steeper risk–
return relationship when the expected outcomes do not reach
the aspiration point. However, our results do not systemati-
cally support different relationships between losses and gains.
Finally, the constant of the variance equation (α
i
) has highly
significant estimates for all the firms, including the former
exceptions. Because this value is significantly different from
zero, it indicates that there is a portion of risk that is not
explained by the difference between the expectation and the
reference point.
In summary, we have obtained significant estimates in ev-
ery case, with only three major exceptions (3.09 percent) in
which beta estimates did not follow the double behavioral re-
lationship. These results allow us to conclude that the model
can be applied using market measures in studies of risk taking
by firms, independently of the chosen country and industry.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The research on Bowman’s paradox has two important gaps:
the identification problem and the lack of evidence at the
market level. To solve the first problem, we provide a
heteroskedastic time-series model that is an econometric trans-
lation from prospect theory. With regard to the second prob-
lem, we test this new model with market measures. With
these contributions, we obtain support for prospect theory
independently of the country or the industry. That is, in spite
of overcoming the previous criticisms, the changing risk atti-
tude follows the behavior of decision makers, as prospect theory
indicates: there is a positive risk–return relationship between
risk and return when the expected return exceeds the refer-
ence level and a negative relationship when the expected re-
turn falls below that reference level.
These results permit two main conclusions. First, prospect
theory may be an explanation for the behavior of the relation
between return and risk. Second, there is no paradox at the
individual firm level, because, when market measures are used,
a negative relationship is not found, as shown in traditional
financial economics.
Nevertheless, in our opinion, the empirical results indi-
cate two more important aspects. First, the value of the inde-
pendent term α
i
 is always positive and significant. That is,
there exists a portion of the variance (risk in prospect theory
terminology) that does not depend on the difference between
the expectation and the aspiration point. In other words, there
are other sources of risk. These sources could be identified
with those other theories found in the previous literature about
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Bowman’s paradox, especially those related to the strategic
position of the firm, which were discussed in the introduc-
tion: the product or consumer orientation (Bettis & Mahajan,
1985; Bowman, 1980), market power (Cool et al., 1989), and
the diversification strategy (Bettis & Hall, 1982; Bettis &
Mahajan, 1985; Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1993). In this sense,
an interesting line of research is the analysis of how the values
of the coefficients of the model could be interchanged by dif-
ferent variables from firm-specific, industry-specific, or coun-
try-specific characteristics. Second, the differences between
the beta parameters of our heteroskedastic model among firms
are important. These differences can also provide some inter-
esting lines of future investigation. As the previous literature
suggests (Lee, 1997; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986), the
degree of risk avoidance or risk propensity is firm specific, as
the different estimates obtained for the beta parameters dem-
onstrate. Therefore, it is worth studying why some firms ex-
hibit more extreme attitudes toward risk than others (and so
their beta values are greater)—that is, what manager-specific,
personal-specific, or firm-specific characteristics determine the
slope of the risk–return relationship, and in what measure
they determine it. The interrelationship between both aspects
is also of interest. For instance, the firms inside some econo-
mies or industries exhibit behavior that is more or less aver-
sion or avoidance to the risk. That is, firms with their behaviors
could try to remove other sources of risk. Perhaps their be-
havior depends on all these sources of risk.
We are aware that our work presents several limitations in
relation to the model, to the sample, and, finally, to the mar-
ket measures. The limitations of the model spring from the
simplifications in its assumptions. Thus, the first aspect would
be the independent term α
i
. While it is considered to be con-
stant, that does not imply that there is a constant risk over
time but that there are other variables that influence the mana-
gerial risk taking, not included in the model and summa-
rized by this independent term. Another simplification is to
consider a linear function between the risk and the difference
between return and the aspiration point. This assumption
implies that the risk aversion or the risk seeking is equal in-
dependently of the value of the loss or gain. We consider that
this is a very restrictive premise. It would be more reasonable
if the risk aversion or the risk seeking were an increasing func-
tion of the loss or gain in relation to the reference point. That
is, when there are more gains, there are more risk-averse atti-
tudes, and when there are more losses, there are more risk-
seeking attitudes. Perhaps a logarithmic function would have
been more appropriate. In relation to the expectation equa-
tion, we have estimated only one a
i
 parameter and only one b
i
parameter by each eighth lag for the entire historic period.
This implies that the increment of the expectation is random
and that this randomness depends on its more recent history
(one week). If this recent history is different, there are differ-
ent increments in the expectation. However, there is always a
degree of temporal stability in each model. As with any time-
series model, if a structural change of behavior exists, two
different models have to be estimated, one before and one
after this structural change.
Our work also presents several limitations in relation to the
sample that should be solved in future research. First, although,
theoretically, the proposed model could be applied to both
market and accounting data, the estimation procedure requires
a very large number of observations. This large number of ob-
servations is almost impossible to obtain with accounting data,
because the periodicity of the data is, at best, quarterly. A pos-
sible solution would be to employ a long historical series of
accounting data, but, in this case, it would be much more dif-
ficult to justify the stability of the model noted above. Second,
the S&P Global 100 index is composed of the largest firms
around the world. It would be interesting to test this model
with other databases to extrapolate the results of this paper.
Finally, because the model is tested with market data, an
implicit assumption is that the returns of the common stocks
are determined by managerial actions. Although this idea has
been frequently employed in the strategic management lit-
erature (Ruefli et al., 1999: 173), it is much more difficult to
justify when daily data are used. In addition, prospect theory
links the relative position to the reference point to the risk
attitude, but makes no direct link between risk and return.
Therefore, implicitly, it is assumed that the risk the firm ex-
periences is the risk the decision maker desired (Lee, 1997: 32).
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